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Fascism, Social-Democracy and the 
Communists 
By V. KRONIN 
1 .  Our Tactics Are Correct 
OMRADES, only six years havc passed since Rudolph 
Hilferding at the Kirl Party Congress of German racial- 
democracy, put forward a new program of post-war social- 
democracy, the theory of "organized capitalism" and of 
"peaceful growing into socialism through democracy." 
The Communists arc going under. This can only bt a matter of 
time. . . . The Communists havc already lost a11 significance for 
the socialist movementi they art loet. 
A great victory of Social-Democracy i s  possible. . . . I say once 
again: we know the path, we know the goal. If  we conduct our 
struggle under the slogan of faithfulncas to wcialist principles, of  
unswcrv ingn~  in the strugglc for our aim-thc winning o f  state 
p o w e r d u t  with freedom to maneuver in our tactics, thcn thc 
pwibility of victory will become reality. 
With these words Rudolf Hilferding concluded his speech 
at the Kiel Party Congress before the Reichstag election of 
I 928. 
The world situation was then characterized by the rela- 
tive stabilization of capitalism. Production, trade and tech- 
nique were advancing. The United States was intoxicated 
with i t s  own prosperity, "the American economic miracle." 
In 1928 social-democracy was in power in Germany, while 
thc Prussian government had been in its hands continuously 
since 1918. The theory of "organized capitalism" was 
adopted by the entire Second International. In the revolu- 
t imay movement the lull which had set H after 1923 was 
still making itself felt. 
It was imder these conditibns that 'two m d d  congresses 
me2 in 1-e Con- of the Seewd International in 
Brumls and the Sixth Con&& ok the Communist Inter- 
national in Mrwcow. And while the social-democrats at their 
Brussels world congress were deciding that capitalism had 
healed its wounds, at that very same moment in those same 
month in the autumn of 1928 our Sixth Congress of the 
Canintern pointed out the coming of a new third period 
in the post-war crisis of capitalism, the period of the shat- 
tering 09 the s tabWon of capitalism and the growth of 
a revolutionary upsurge of the masses, .At the time when 
dat -demoeraq,  together with its bowg&sk, was celebrat- 
h g  the recovery' of capitalism, our world Communist Party 
hurled in their faces the challenging statement : 
Gentlemen, you may feast today but you are sick to the 
death, before you get home the plague of the crisis will 
eeizc you. 
Within a year the appmach of an e~)nomic risis of over- 
production was already making itself felt throughout the 
whole ,world. After the mass demonstrations in rga7 against 
the execution of Sacco snd Venzetti-demonstrations which 
showed that the lull in the labor rn0vemer.t was already 
passing away- mighty strike movement developed in 
I@ (Lodz, the Ruhr, Munich-GladW, etc.). But d a l -  
democracy, which had rebated from Mamism, was the last 
to recognize the changes that were taking place. It was still 
fascinated by the theories of "organized qitalism" and of 
. "dwelopmeat without crisis." Brought face to face with the 
. approaching bankruptcy of the Wumr Republic, German 
socialdemcxrscy at the Megdeburg Pa* Congress in ~gzg 
still vaunted its strength. Deitmann declared that there':id 
more sodaIism in G e m n p  than in the U.SS.R.; Wels de- 
clared : If there is +to be dictatorship, then kt it be our dic- 
tatorship. Socialdemocracy was intasifyimg the terror 
against the rwolutiomry proletariat, against the growing 
revolutionary upsurge of 'the masses, showing ever more 
clearly ' its antidemocratic face. 
I n  sharp contrast to the opinions voiced by sodrdemoc- 
racy, we pointed out at our Tenth Pientun in July xgag that 
the contradictions befween classes and states were gmwhg, 
that a new revo~utionary upsurge was rising, tbat an em- 
n&c ahis was not far off. 
Time passed. The economic crisis was d r d y  raging over 
the whde w'orld, In the spring of $930 the bourgeoide ex- 
pelled the daldemocrats from their min i s t ed  posts 'in 
Germany. In the autumn the Labor Government in EngIand 
suffered defeat. The theory of "organized capitalism" had 
collapsed ; the d-demoaats put forward the "thwry" 
that agi$rlism was seriously ill and that it behooved the 
smial-democrats to save it. 
And at this time at the Eleventh Plenum.of the E.C.C.I. 
we showed the masses the growing contrast of two systems, 
the systm of W s m  in construction and the system of 
decaying capitalism ; we noted the g r o h  of the pmrequis- 
it- for a mlutionary crisis in a number of countries, 
pointed out that for the toiling masses the only way out of 
the crisis is rwolutian. 
Finally, at our ' last Twelfth PIenum of the ' Executive 
Committee of the. Comintem, when social-dem- had 
already lost its head and had commenced babbling abut  a 
counter-revolutionary situation, we firmly and assuredly 
stated that the stabhation of capitalism was coming to an 
md. that the world was confronted hth great c l a s h  be- 
tween c l a w  and states, that there was a possibility ef abrupt 
chanms and upheavals. that the t w i t i o n  to a new round 
of revolutions and wars was being eBected. 
In all OW estimates of the situation we have been proved 
right. Our analysis has been justified from year to year. We 
have not had occasion to revise wr views on any pint .  But 
everything which was put forward against us by the theore- 
ticians of the birgaoisie and abvc all by smialdemocracy, 
aP this has been falling to pima from year to year like a 
house of cards. For we have based ourselves and mcrntinue 
t~ base oursielves on the only scientific theory-the theory of 
Marxism-Leninism, while socialdemxracy has long ago be- 
trayed Marxism, for we are not afraid to look facts in the 
face or to call things by their propet names. 
-4med with the theoq of Marxism-Leninism, analyzing 
with its help the world situation, recognizing the tremendous 
diculties which confront us, we a l l  the toilirg m ~ s w  to 
take up the struggle against fascism and war, for the over- 
throw of the power nf the exploiting classes and the setting 
up of the dictatorship of the pro!ehria~. Rwmgnizing our 
tremendous responsibility for the fate of tlte world labor 
movement, we have carried out all uur work durinq the past 
year on the basis of the instructions of the Twelfth Plenum 
of the E.C.C.I. 
In the two main key points, in Germany and in the Far 
East, the contradictions of the capitalism system have 
reached their great& accentuation. The revolutionary u p  
surge has continued to p o w  throughout the whole world. In 
China the Soviet revolution has extended. In Spain, Ger- 
many, Poland, CzechosloMkia and many other countries 
there have been severe class battles. But for the time being 
fascism has conquered in Germany. For a short t h e  the 
German bourgeoisie has c~1~0Iidated its power. War is 
spreading in the Far East. An attack by Japan on the U.S. 
S.R. is on the order of the day. But we can nevertheless 
point &.the fact that our ~ a r i o u s  Communist Party of Ger- 
many has done everything for tEpe swtggle &nst W s m  
which was in its pwer and which was &-bed by the given 
concrete codation of dass f o m .  We can dm say that 
the Japmese and Chinese Cmmnuni& P d m  bave dane 
e v e %  which was in wt p ~ m r  and whkh was dit- 
tated by the given t9net.ete codatign 'of forces f ~ r  
the s-e ag&st war. Bnd if at the present time h&m 
comes to &r in a number of eb~ntries, if the rjlLr &in- 
revohtion, - . . '1 ger has become an immediate o m  nevertheless we c ~ n  say now with even grester am- than at any h e  before; &e forces of the revdtltion are growing despite f d t  .kr- rot. and saeial4cmmcy. No gangs of HM& and no armies of Araki are able b hold up this p * h  of the forus of 
Ow a n d M  of #ha dtdh & hie. OW W s  are r m e c t  
- k t  I s  what is down w by a glance h k  over the devel- 
opment 0% events for the last five years sirace the Rxth Cmi- 
gas of the Gmmmist Intematiorral. 
At the p m t  time, as Comxadc R e  said b, an 
the be& of the unalterable lam of its ddepment,  the 
w& is a M y  direetty appra&c&g a new mrmd of revotu- 
tims and wars. 
The firmest foundations of capitalist detyare being shat- 
tered by the gigantic dc&n&ive f0.m d the eri~is. the 
growth in the strength of thE U.S.SR. and the of 
the mIutiomry movement of the toiling m in the 
capi.di& countries t 4 d v e s .  The contradict ton^ bet- 
claw% 4 states are being a-atdd Q a m r o p h i c  
degree, Not one single capitalist state can be certain that its 
frontiers are seewe, Not one single aP;Wist gmwnment ia 
confident of what tomtomarrow will bring. Ewrywhtm sharp 
encounters are going on between the f o m  of revolution and 
the foms of reaction. 
The preparations for the bar between states are taking 
the' form of u w of #kg most poweflirl fwcw of the bow- 
g e e  w&t the Cnmmwkrt Party mi the wwking JarJ. 
Th cmtradictiorrs betweeu capitalisf c ~ & s  we b&g ac- 
cmtwted t~ fbe hQhest d e p e .  Meanwhile a wave of na- 
ti&alism is 'rising and this is &np: utilized by the b u r -  
&sie for s- up in a number of countries the power of 
the mosd extreme rgucpionmy, charrGrkFb, fascist partbs of 
the buwge~isis. The dark& for& of reaction, remnants'of 
the Middle Ages, are being mobilized in order to defend 
rapitafi&, which is at its death gasp, 
But neveAeless the ruling classes see that they are not 
masters of the situation ia their own system. The capitalist 
world is drifting rudderless towards b own ruin. The pM- 
osophers of the expoitiug classes are filled with profound 
pessimism and a w e  about the decline of Eu~pe. Their 
writers write Utopian novels about the war ofl the future 
and t?k betie Gp &f 'fascist dict&Mip;'aht the dictator- 
ship of the f e w 4 e  engineers, technicians and airmen. 
Tlleir economists, while predicting-fresh prosperity and the 
end of the crisis, are shown to be mere stock exchange 
smdators gambling on a rise in the price of shares or reac- 
tionary Utopians raving abut turning back the course of 
history to petty commdty production. Their poldticians speak 
with supreme cynicism a b u t  the pending war, as tlrey are 
accustomed to speak about their plans for a pleasure excur- 
sion in the .Medikmmean next summer. Senile decay llas 
seized upon the ruling classes, who have shown thansclves 
bankrupt in the f a  of history. 
Capitalism has outlived its day. The &st thinkers of cap- 
italist society are beginning to grasp this fact to an ever 
a 

And those figures which have been given here at the Plenum 
by Comrade Kuusinen* showing the tremendous growth o f m  
- 
* Before the war tbe total mta budget of Germany comprised 7 per 
cent of tho national income 1 in 1929, the expenditure of tbe Rich and 
of the various statu and municip.litim mmpriaed 26 per cent, and in 
1932, 33 per cent of the nationaI income. In the United Stom the 
federal budget in 1913 comprised d y  2 per cent of the rsationd 
incomer in 1932 the &arc in-d dxfold. In England the prt-war 
budget c o m p r d  8 per ant of the nat iod  income, and in 193 2, 23 ptr 
nat j in Frame, pre-mx budget 14 per cent, now 25 per eent 8 in Italy, 
pm-war budget 16 per mt, now 34 per cent of &a national income. 
Tbc proporti- d the txpeaditure on armamcnta to the total bndgn 
is as foflom: in France, direct cxpmditnre on armamcnta in 1920 rep- 
rcsentcd 17 per ctnt of the mtaf budget and in 1931 it rrwt to 32  
mat; ia Italy the proportion  oat from 30 per mnt in 1929 to 35 pcr 
ecnt in 1932, iu Japan it mec from 28 per cmt in 1929 ta S f  per cent 
in t 933. T b e  fignm apply to txpcnditure on ormarnentu in the mict 
mMe of the. word. If, however, we include cxpendimrc an the police 
and on the National fib?, we win h d  that the expmditure of b u r -  
geoia mted on prst and future wars rcpr#en$i from 40 to 70 pu cent 
of their total budgets. Truly, a gigantic increase in padtim. 
T o  t h e  figom mna be addtd the enormow srmrs that bwrgcojs 
governmab spend on effom to save the big trw and b8nts0, md on 
mving their p d t a  We have already pointed to the f a a  that in the 
United Statw the mtasuns taken by the R o d t  gwcrnmmt in 1953 
involve expendimre on subsidies and guarantm amouatiag to 15,000,000 
d h .  In l d y ,  tbc govtrnmmt d o a t t d  7,000,000 lire to corn- 
pcasatc for the 1- incurred by the big concerns, In  Germany, for 
thc p n ~  d mving the big bankm alone the govcrnmcnt spent l,i00,- 
000,000 mark,  "Proviaion of work" dm# in Germany wiu cami 
tbe Empiren 3,967,000,000 marks. The HitIer gownmmt iu 
making W expenditure on meant of the thedgcta of frtmrc F I :  
thus, ia 1933 cxptnditum has been made on account of anticipated 
budget d p b  for 1934 amounting to 700,000,000 markq and w 
anticipated redpm from the budget of 1938 o f  no Itm &an 2,000,000,- 
000 m a t h  This swindling and robbing of the Treasury is d l e d  
"p&dng." (From the epee& of Comrade Kuuainen at the Thu- 
*nth Plenum of the E.C.C.I.) 
t h k  part of the natiand whieh is a& 
l a d  up by the state--these @urn f regard as q praof & A .  
the u w d  acmtuation af tfae c k a  struggleand th a m p  
& between states, ns a proof of the w d m m s  a d  im&b&y 
of the capitalist system. Chpitalism waats  to, prolong Its life 
by au@netst&qg tbe state d i n e ,  by iacming the m e a , ~  
by which it suppresses the e~p1~ited classes. 
'The state," as En& said, "is &st arld fmmost de- 
t a c h m t s  of afmed people with material appendkp, mcb 
as prisons!' The more capitrrlism &es its s&te of over- 
maturity, the more dues the borrrgeoisie base i td f  on f h  
army, the &ce, and on* all modern military t e t h a u e  for 
the suppression of the: redstarm of the toiling masses, the 
is the gmwth of terror a e s t  the t o i l i ~  masses, 
The rule of the hourgaaisie becomes a Moody regime w h m  
m d e d  deatoastraths and pasatit nprfsings are sW 
down, whem the villages of c o l d 4  p p f e s  are attadad 
gas and airplanes and where the prisons of 'the smalled ad- 
vaiid, cdtured, civilized *guntries use the methods of tbe 
medied inquisr'tiw, T h e  October Revolution in Russia and 
the Civil War which ensued u p  it have already k e n  far 
exceeded in the number of their vi&s by the' Chhm 
~evoludon a d  the draggle in Gemby. 
IM bespite t4e iact that terror has k c m e  the cmmm 
m& d;F &averment employed by the. boar@&, never- 
theless it has not s u d e d  in conddathg its rule, Thb is 
why the ruling financial oligatEhy is trying stin further to 
smqthm the state apparatus, to create a state p w e ~ ,  the 
gitil of whicb is to rrveCMnne tkc htcma1 mntmdietions of 
& capitalist system by mww of 'e, the b l d y  sup 
pression of the growi- m l u t k w y  mumment, the mobt 
ilization of all forces of the capitalist shte for the s&ug& 
a&& the tailing masses. Themfore in the p r m t  period, 
on the eve af a new round of remludas and w, the 
1 1  
finanad oligamhy naturally adopts the policy of fascism, 
this most despeqe attempt of the most reactionary, terror- 
ist natiodistic groups of the bourgeoisie to maintain state 
powor in their own hands by strengthening the state appara- 
tcls of supprqsion, terror and civil war against the toiring 
masses, this attempt to find a way out of the crisis by means 
of intensified preparations for a new imperialist war, for 
a new repartition of the world. 
The present wave of f a ~ i s m  is not a sign of strength, 
but a siw of the ufeahe~s wui ktability of the whob cuk- 
ifdirt systm,  which the bowrgetG& is kyhg to s ~ r m g t h e ~  
by herearing the state w h i n e  and by udoph'rog fmcist 
mtkods for the sugprsssioa of the w s e s .  The burgeoisie 
is goityr over to government by methods of terrmist fascist 
dictatorship, wf of 3s  oms me#? d, but of f ~ e c ~ d t y .  It 
is organizing for itself a m+s support from among the 
ptty-buwoisie who have gone raving mad in the condi- 
tions of thi crisis, promising them that it will support the 
petty proprietor. It is forming terrorist gangs out of nation- 
alist-chauviaist elunents. It makes these gangs a part of the 
state appa&us, and, relying upon them, declares civil war 
against the working class because its old nomd abfuratus 
hm adready tat the puwer to cojr d k  the task of suppress- 
ing fhe d m h d d e n  chses. It is doing away with bour- 
geois law because the prestige of the bourgeois state p e r  
and law has ceased to have any inA= on the worm 
masses, because the illusion of the psibility of peaceful 
development of capitalism and of the democratic path to 
-socialism is  e s h i n g ,  because decisive battles are ap- 
proaching, because the bourgeoisie has been brought face to 
face with the inevitability of supremely severe wars whkh 
reprexnt o danger to itself. M u s e  parliamentarism is no 
l o w r  able to secure the defense of capitalism against the 
growing revolutionary movement, and to secure the prepam- 
tions for a war for a repartitioa of marketa 
w i t a s .  It is beghdng to interfere 
ities, to take so-called state apitalistic m 
whde system of capitalism has been mrderminad, btmwE'. 
t i e  cdlapse of a single bank or trust irs beginning to thrc&aj 
that the whole a t e  appa~gf~g will collapse. Time is h f o ~  . 
nothirig ta be surprised at if such a pwmment of fingnrk 
capital, such an arch-&may government ss the fad& 
government of Ritler or Mussolini tries to unite the W s  
or talks of nationaliaing them. This is not a step toward , 
soeiatism, the contrary, it is an attempt to gave the 
power of finance capital from complete bankruptcy, 
But the victory of fascism becomes inevitable and p8s- 
aibfe only where d-demmracy has d e d  by means of 
its system of c e n M  mass workers' organizations in hold- 
i ~ g  back its proletarian adherents from a united m1*- 
ary front with the Cwnmunists, in preventing the winning 
over of the majority of the proletxiat, despite the mmt 
profound crisis, to the side of the Comrnwist Party and 
besides this in preventing these sucassa  of the class strug- 
gle of the prolebriat and thus discrediting Marxism and 
the class struggle in the eyes of the broad masea of the 
urban petQ-bou& and the peasantry. Fa&m cannot 
conquer wen in one country without the dirtct help and 
support of social-demacracy, which over a prolonged period 
of time splits the ranks of the prdehriat, holds it back from 
struggle, weakens its ftghGng capacity by way of police vie 
h c e ,  terror and d q ' o n ,  delivering it over to kcism with 
i ts  hands bound. 
3. F m G b  and -n S u c i a I - ~  
The more o + d  the masses are, tbe more grave the 
situation of mpM is, the more rapidly and more compleidy 
does fascist dictatorship effect the abolition of all non- fascist 
or not eomptetely fascist organizations and the more does it 
stand in need of d d  state capitaIist measures and of 
the mqmate system. MussoIini in Italy achieved the aboli- 
tion of the old bourgeois parties, b u s e  their existence did 
not w t l y  hinder fascist dictatorship. Mussolini for a time 
talerated social-democracy because in Italy it played a rda- 
tivdy mal l  role. He destroyed it when it entered its first 
& crisis. Hitler came power in a country which is 
d w c k o r ~ t .  in a countrv in which it is impossible to 
strengthen centralization of leadership without smashing up 
the d d  bourgeois parties and organizations, and in which it 
is' impossible to do away with that struggle which weakens 
rhe hrgeoisie iiself, the mad struggle between different 
capitatist groups for the distribution of a diminishing share 
in the surplus value, of a diminishing quantity of profit, the 
struggle to have their losses made good by the state, without 
destroying the representations af these groups (parties, or- 
ganizations). Hitler came to power in a country in which 
' the m k i n ~  class was more highly organized than in any 
other. But the trade unions of the German proIetariat, the 
leademhip of which had been seized by the socialdemocrats, 
had Iong ~eased to be militant class organizations. The larg- 
rst party, that which leads the majority of the proletariat, 
bad  become social-fascist. The Communist Party, despite the 
rapid growth of its influence, had not yet been able to under- 
mine the niass influence of social-democracy. 
Without its revolutionary class leadership, the workirtg 
class is not capable of action of any kind. In order to IM 
able to act in a revolutionary way, the working class must 
be united around its revolutionary party. Since the Com- 
munist Party did not yet have tlte majority of the working 
class behind it, the fate of the German proletariat depentled 
on the conduct of the social-democrats, 
In order to suppress the working class, fard&-rt Fdd 
above rrll the task of destroying the Cmmm~ 'at w. 
in such an accentuated situation u existed and contitlm & - -, 
exist in Gcmmny, the Seal-J)emociatic Patty, add the trd& 
unions in parti=ular, maid have become r a d &  for 
gathering together of elements discontented with 
Even in March any organization, even such a 
organization as the Stad Hdmets, was beeoaring such a 
reservoir. W 1 1 9 e  ~ I d t m o e r a e y  was stilI ar#i&dy 
sa*ong to hold back massts from resistance to the 
I I 
r'(rmiag of fasdst didatorship by means of it3 system d 
centralized organktians, but was already k f k h & y  
&my to ensure the stability of the capitatist system by ite 
support, fasdsm when it came to p w e r  smashed ap i& w- 
dBfMtt, social-demomy, and broke up the s a e * a I d e m d  
organieations in order to pulverize the wo~kiw claw, Itl 
order itself to atempatempt to lead the working masses. now dh- 
organid and deprived of their orjpnizations, to idu& 
them in the system of the fascist state or, if this p r o d  im- 
passible, at Ieast to pulverize them. The temp at d c h  lh 
German fascists have dected rhcir "hwrporation" uf 
bourgeois parties and capitalist organizations and also W 
of ~d~~ and the reformists and Christian trade 
mion-his tempo is to be explained not by the f& that 
Hitler has learned arlythin~ from Mpssolini, bpiE PIsf aJd 
f ormost by the fact that Hitler came to power un&r d- 
ti- when German capitalism could be saved for the time 
being ody by the immediate subordination of all iti pfh to 
the rabidly centraliaed dictatorial power of the fasdst st+ 
Secondly, it is to be explained by the fact that in Ge- dte 
par l imenhy  system, and together with it sod- 
whicb had participated in the governmmt dnce 1918, bad b 
came bankrupt and decayed more than in any othr country. 
German s~h14emaemcy was ready to agree to anything; 
German d d e m o e r a c y  itself permitted Hitler to come to 
power, but fascism demanded of socialdemmaq such large 
doses of nationalism and chauvinism, such a subordination 
to the wil l  of h c e  capital as wwld in any ase have meant 
the destruction of its organizations, "incorporation,'? merg- 
ing with the Nazis; and social-dwnocmcy, while no imperi- 
alist war had as yet broken out, a u l d  not yet bring its organ- 
ization to this, although it tried to do so. This fact is proved 
by the =signation of Wds from the Second International 
in the beg ieng  of March 1933, and by the sociddemocratic 
-fraction in the Reichsbg voting & favor of Hitler's policy 
on May 17. 1933. Hitler was obviously in a hurry. The 
wbole situation in Getmany, the atastrophidy seripus 
position of German mpitalism, com*ed him to make haste. 
He was therefore obliged to demand of social-democracy, 
this over-ripe Fraulein, more than she was able to give, 
and since she could not satisfy his desires, he killed her. 
German social-democracy has perished as a party after hav- 
ing played to the last its role as concubine of the German 
bourgeoisie, after having satisfied to tbe extent of its powers 
all the desires of all its masters from the Democratic Party 
to the party of the National-Socialists inclusive. 
Incidentally, this resembled suicide rather than murder 
b u s e  sodaldem~etaty. as Comrade H d e r t  correctly 
wrote in his article What Js HU#$&PQ ifi Germany, per- 
ished not because Hitler proved stronger. Social-dem~racy 
pmished -use it killed itself polfialIy md owordly, hut+ 
ing refwsed to jigkt f ~ p h ,  cap;bdated before f&, con- 
smted to  a t #  ifS s&~. 
The fact of German d d c m o e r a q ' s  bankruptcy is so 
evident even to the Second Intcmatid, even to its theore- 
ticians and its publicists, that any attempt to deny it would 
be ridiculous. But while admitting the bankruptcy of Ger- 
man &&democracy, the other parties of the Second In- 
German sdal-democracy and not on the line of the Semhd 
Internatimd, not on the fact that thqr have kcome social- 
fas&s. For us, the whole point is that they have - 
social-fascists. 
But there is nothing new in all this criticism directed by 
the Second Intwnational against German daldemouacy, 
against its disaster, against its bnkruptcg. Wels d y  did 
what MacDonald had done before him, omly less summf ul- 
ly and with different consequences. Then Wels and Vander- 
velde criticized MacD~4atd; now Vanderveldc, 31- Hea- 
derson and Bauer have criticized WeLs- M a c h d d  split th 
English Iaboritm, went over m y  to thc side of the bour- 
geoisie, kept his post as. minister of t2lc cram. He p a v e d  
necessav: Wels pmed memsmy. He wm. tltruwn . 
The quarrel b e t w e  Wds and V a n d d d e  hasack€ in 
a temporary d i a t i o n  k u s e  Wds c d d  mt join the 
German n a W  fdnt and w compded to return to the 
.%cmti International. Tbis is how it was: he left the Second 
International, went to Hi*, was not accepted, was t o 1 6  
"Better wrvc in the h m d  Internatid," a d  Petumed to 
the Second Lntedonal ,  where he opas accepted. 
.While "accusing" GeYman socid-y fm the fact 
that the German revolution of 1918 did not con- the 
hisbric tasks of the bourgeols-democratic revolution of I&@ 
-su& tasks za omrvertiag the d ~ b d u t i s t  state into a 
d a m t i c  state, m-q th bouph m 
lutim again& feudaiism which was begun in Frame in r* 
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the general offensive against the Jtmkers who continued to 
play a great part in the Getmany of the Weimat Constitution, 
they tried to lay the blame on the "special conditions of the 
d u t h t l  of rgr8." which they alleged "made it difimlt 
to #ea thc transition from the tasks of the bourgeois- 
demmatic revolution to wrying out the tasks of the pro- 
letarian mfution," blaming social-democracy in Germany 
for the fact that "it did not ensure the sta&ility of the demo- 
cratic regime in Germany and surrendered power to Hitler." 
The theoreticians of the Second International in criticizing 
German sociatdemocmcy, want to save the d e d  "hmor" 
of so-called "democratic-socialism," to make it at any rate ap- 
p a r  as if their whole strategic plan had nor proved bank- 
rupt, to preserve the life of the Second International, some- 
how w other. By explaining the defeat of its leading party 
which had disgraced their tactics and strategy, by these spe- 
cific conditions prevailing in Germany, they wanted to keep 
the masses of other countries under their leadership, to save 
tbc leaders and the system which have proved bankrupt, 
to save and resurrect socia!democracy. 
But afl these attempts to explain the catastrophe of the 
Gwman dd-democratic party are absolutely futile. It is, 
of course, true that the revolution of 1918 did not eonsum- 
mate the bautgeois-dmocratie revolution of rw and 1789 : 
it is true that social-dernmmy, by disrupting this revolution, 
added the Weimr constitution as a superstructure to J u ~ k e r  
lamhncrship, preserve the I u u k ~ s  and the Hohcnzoltern 
o h m i ,  securing them their pions. It is, of course, true 
that in 19x8 socialdemoerav did not take the path of sociaf- 
ist revolution. although all conditions were praent for it, 
a d  in alliance with the Juflkers and officers srnasl~ed the 
&st revolution which was hginning. 
But that is by no means all. 
In the last analysi* the main point is that since 1918 Ger- 
man socialdemacracy IMP brought about tht 
the bourgeoisie in the 
under conditions o 
ticular, in such a rmr 
feat in the irnperiali*~ 
the readonary dicta1 
that whiie fighting 
the country, it extendrd complete freedom to the fad&, 
and by breaking up tile revoIutionary l a b  organhtio~l 
German sdaldcmwrat-> led the G m  proletariat undet 
the yoke of fascist dictatorship. Without German d- 
democ.racy there would i~ot  have heen fascism in Germany. 
Without the direct help given by sociairdemocracy, tht bat!- 
geoisie cannot set up i ~ w i f i  dictatorship, cannot g.lwerm th 
country. 
4. If Social-Democracy in 193 2 . . . 
Thrce years ago Mueller, then a Iefr soEialdemocrat of 
Breslau. wrote a fwltastic novel entitled If in 1918 We 
Hod . . . that is to my, how events would have developed if 
social-democracy had 1u.m a moluti0~18ry party in 1918. 
W e  wuld now draw a ~rtopiaa picture of what &ht have 
happened if s&da~~a:racy in July 1932 had hen  willing 
ia defend Weimar "d~t~~mracy"-jvst hat and no m o d f  
it had only been ariltiu~g to defend the Weimar "democracy." 
At that time we pmpospd to form a united front with social- 
democracy for the declaration of a general strike. The work- 
ing masses were in favor of a general strike. They were only 
awaiting instructior~s (rmti the trade unions and tbe Social- 
Democratic Pa*. Tlrc . d - d m r a t i c  workers hesitated 
to answer the call 
ed-democracy. If stwa 
rnunist's proposal o i  n I 
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it had ody taken advantage of its state apparatus for offer- 
ing resistance to the fascist coup in Prussia, then the fascists 
would have been compelled to rebat. The petty-bourgeois 
and peasant masses would have been turned toward the path 
of revolution. The fascists, unable to seize power, would 
have collapsed. The symptoms of cohpse in August 1932 
were very marked, despite the fact that Prussia was already 
in tltc hands of Papen's commissars. The Communists were 
ready for a struggle. The struggle was broken by the social- 
democrats, In January 1933 the situation was already less 
favorable, but the social-democrats would none the less Iuw 
been stronger than the fascists. If the daldmocmts had 
supported the January demonstration of the Communists 
against fascism in Berlin, HitIer would not have dared to 
sneak into power. If, even on January 30, 1933, social- 
democraq had accepted the Communists' proposal of a gen- 
eral strike, had declared a general strike and not held the 
masses back from a strike, had not broken the general strike, 
llitler could have been beaten by the united forces of the 
wh& p d & w h  despite the fact that the time was up and 
that a nati~nakt upheaval wash already here. . 
How long the Weimar Republic would have been main- 
tained after such a strike would have depended only on the 
working masges themselves. The Communists would have 
continued the struggle to win over the majority of the work- 
ing class with still greater energy. They would have shown 
the masses that the only way out of the crisis lay in swial- 
ism, that the fascists could only finally be beaten by setting 
up the dictatorship of the proletariat. But such a militant 
union against Hitfer would not yet have denoted a smialist 
revolution until a majority of the working class followed the 
Communists. This would have been in its way a struggie 
against a "Kotnilw redt." The German Communists would 
have fought together with the socialdemoeratic workers 
t h e  eqmhg the mfaktlew, the &ti011 of 
Sw-, ex-tbeir att- C ccdhh .  Ell 
ing ta cr&e those d t b s  under which the 
c w f d d ~ t a k e p o w ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ r ~ n h s n d b i .  
str~ggle, capitdating to Hidu *tit a &bt; it e ~ r p  Wtfi 
d the mnhg of Hitler as a rnaa of wddng origia. 
I;ermag &dunocraq iWf d-ed the W e b  h 
public once and $or all and kflIed itdf. 
ButthiaishappeningaotomtyInGermany. 
f n  S p h I  after the rew1uh of April 1931, dal-dcm- 
orracy ta power in coalition with b w g m i s  
Having mne to pa-, Spanish a o c i a l ~ ~ c y  wuit
wholly and 8ndoompletdy over to the c a m t ~ ~ u t i ~  path 
af German s d a l - d ~ ~  The Spanish codition gov- 
ernment, basing itself an the old s a t e  apparatus of the ma- 
archy, on its ihwdia Cieril, p & ~  md army, waged a st* 
gle a& the masses of w o r k s  and peamts who were 
for bread, for d h - e ,  for the s m - h m r  
workingday forthtworhandforland f o r t h e m  
for the Mt of sdfI&tembtioa f a  oppressed pplcs. 
The feudal landt~rds, morrasterks and church= -in h&r 
rights. hmmts of. feudatism, remnmts of serfdm and 
of the middle ages continue to &st+ Not m e  d u t i m a q  
measure has been put into effect. Not one bourgeois-landlord 
m i  mpnhatioa has been d b d ,  n&g has k e n  
done to m e  resbtame to the forces of mun~-~wolu-  
tim But the Communist Party is subjected to persecution, 
its pms ha9 ken d b d  h, Revolutionary workers and 
are being persermted. And there i~ nothing surpris- 
irrg in the fact that* thanks to &is pofiep of daEdem~. racg ,  
ma- are ttirnjng a&st it, tht at the m t  elections, 
Spanish d - d - c y  sufEered a m e  defeat. 
Spanish social-democracy also criricim the poIicy pur- 
sued by German socialdemocracy, bur it pursues this policy 
itself, for &aldanocracy cannot do othexwise with what- 
rver "left* phrases it may seek to hidr itself. Spanish d a l -  
dun- is just the same as Grrntan; it will surrender 
power to the hscists if the Sp-i~t~isli C.mrnunists do not 
quickly isdatc it from the masses. 
In Amtrio, Otto Bauer tras fmqucraly written that .\us- 
trim social-democracy in 1918 cuuld rmt pursue a policy 
lor the winning of socialism, k u l s r  .4ustria is a malt 
country and would have k n  cn~shed at once by interven- 
timists if it had tried to fight against capitalism. But Otto 
Bauer wants to corneal the fact thar in Austria t-where 
he was in power+& only was nothing done for the setting 
t ~ p  of socialism, but even the task of the bourgeois&tno-. 
cratic +revolution were not thoroufly camed out, the idu-  
ence nf the Juplkprs was not destroyed nor that of the Haps- 
burg ofticers. Otto Bauer, while critic.izing German social- 
demmracy, wants to conceal the fvct that on Dec. r ,  rgag, 
he had already had something akin ro the Prussian July m, 
that Austrian &aldemucracyI disqising itself in radical 
p h m ,  has retreated and is retreatitig step by step to makt 
way for thc fascist dictatorship, that h tr& socialvdmoc- 
racy is disrupting the struggle of tlie Austrian proletariat 
against incipient Austmfascism, in jrlst the same way as 
this was done mer a period of many years by German social- 
dmmracy, Otto Bauer forgets that only four years ago his 
friend and asdate,  the other Austm-Marxist, Karl Renner, 
was trying to show that sacid-demo&-racy, learning a lesson 
irom Italy, should try to collabontp with the fascists, re- 
nounee parliamentary activity, fight to r d n  its places in 
the state apparatus. Coaqent ly  Karl Renner four years 
ago was already finding theoreti4 arguments for that shame- 
ful policy which J.oebe and Kuer~st%r pirrsuerl in the Ger- 
man Reicbs- on hIa y 17. 1933. This must- not 
Austrian d d e m o c r a c y ,  thanks to this po 
has pursued, has growl cwnsidem 
few years. N e v e r t h k  it is still 
day than Austrian iasdsr~. if it 
strength of the Austria11 wurkers who follow it, the Austrw ' 
fascists would vanish irt~ru the face of the earth. With art- ; 
tagonisms sharpend :b dtey now are, not one general staff 
--and Bauw is -p re [erring to these staffs-wauld ven- 
ture to interfere. It  i s  hardly likely that any large state 
would make up its mittd to start a war on account of Austria 
i the present situatiou. llm Austrian social-demwracy tail 
only chatter that i t  will call  upon the workers for a generid 
strike in the event ai ioreiv troops invading Austria, in 
. the event of Seitx. rhr sm-i:~l-democratic Mayor of Vierma, 
k i n g  removed fro111 hir p s t ,  in the event of the Socia- 
Democratic Party brinp ~r~ppressed and the refmist trade 
unions being "hcoqmra~ed." it misses one opportunity after 
another, and by its l~ .ss i i * i~y  it alienates the petty-hurgeois 
masses from the proiaaritlt. 
By its policy of reil~.ci~tg to fight, it is demoralizing the 
proletariat. It is prcparitlg for i t s  complete capitulation to 
fascism, for the sarreurkr of both Vienna and Austria to 
the fascists. By its whdf prlliry it is preparing for the defeat 
of the Austrian prd~rariat.  
Five-sixths of thr . \~ts~ri:rq proletariat still fdIm .Arts- 
triatt sacia1-dernocr;rt.y. T l l c  9ustrian workers are in favor 
o l  the general strike: 111r: want to frght. Btrt they still sup- 
pase that socid-de.nlilr:ra~-~. represents their organization, 
which will call upnn t 1 1 w t 1  fight when this is necessary. I f  
soeial-demcmacy had ileri a general strike, the proletariat 
would have been u*kcd in the struggle against fascism, and 
wotrld have repulsed ~ I I P .  ixwist ooffensive. The Communists 
woulrl haw been the first organizers of the straggle. The 
Communists would not have raised the question of h e -  
a e l y  setting up the dictatorship of the proletariat until the 
majority of the working dass were behind them. For the 
time being they would only have d e d  on agitation for 
the dkhtor&p of the proletariat, for Soviet power as the 
only salvation for the working class of Austria from poverty, 
want and fascisni. They would have waged a struggle for 
hegemony in the Austrian labor movement, showing that the 
only d d w ,  the only way out of poverty and want, lies 
in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only after winning 
over the masses would they have undertaken an armed 
uprising for the setting up of Soviet potr~er. 
But the Communists would have fought against fascism 
tagether with the social-democrats if the smial-democrats 
had been willing to fight. 
The Austrian Communists stand alone against the united 
front of social-democracy and the bourgeoisie, and they 
-mot yet successfully conduct a general strike since they 
annot get the main &ons of the proletariat to follow 
them. Brrt they set themselves the task of showing the work- 
ers the way to fight against fascism. They make it their task 
to organize the struggle which the sociaIdemocrats do not 
want to wage. If social-democracy takes advantage of the 
relative weakness of the Austrian Communists and surrend- 
ers power to the fascists, the responsibility will lie solely 
on smialdemoeraq for all those horrors which will fall to 
the lot of the Austrian working class. The Communists will 
not mpitulate. They will fight on alone against fascism and 
war. for the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
In ht& and Esthosia faxkt dictatorship is hing set up. 
And here again, just as in Austria, it is socialdemocracy 
which decidw the question of whether there is to be a fascist 
dictatorship or not. It and it alone bears the respnsibility 
for the fate of the Latvian and E s t h o h  working W id 
the prment concrete situation. 
Without tbe help of s o c a a e m ~ c y  fascist dkwodip  
w d d  not have been set up in Germany, annot be sf& up -: 
either in Austria, in Spah, in Latvia, in E s t h h  or in any 
other cantry. 
In Csackostmki& fascist dictatorship is rapidly being es- 
I qtabsshed. In April 1933 the semedat of the ECC.1. had 
already written as follows to the Central Cmmit ta of the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia : 
3 4 
'Xhcp-of rhPf&tionof &ddmdhir-h 
iaowaqmialwar. To@atthep~rimtofaElrmabgipdt  
in thchd& and dl the more m of a ~ i n g ~  which ia 
j~ beginaing, would mspn to u a d e h l e  tbe mrioama of tbs 
p-t moment and tbt pomibility of a suddcn attack and provoca- 
tion agaimt the Communh hrtg  on tbt E#rt of tbc 9- goPr- 
m, and a h  to o n d d ~  rbe counter-revotutionarg role 
of mcjal-demouacg. rSls main thing fo* CZ& Communh at the 
prrseat time i8 to grarp the fact tbrt the group 
tbo lcadmhip of the C A  bourgeoisie which u trp.ing to mrg out 
the national eoncentratioa and faecimtion of thcbwhvahia uadat 
tbt h r  of tbr def- of udawm@' and of a w d k e  
lo-c.allsdUdefd'of the Vedhrgrtemin&Ili&na rritbfeleia 
Poland, P o g d v i a  and Romania d e r  tk W p  of F- 
batb agriaa the prolstnxian rwolution and a h  a @ ~  the fadst 
rwiaienia plam of Gnmnny. The waw of aatiodian in Gtr- 
maay wan directed ag.8it~ the Wcim~i republic sl ibe expr-h of 
Germany% d a v ~ m ~ t  to he h r i o m  mtria ‘Tim q b o l  
of victory of Czceh n a t i o d h  is the -," be it rap* 
xnta the main channel uniting natiodat taudencia which an 
d n g  in the C d  people, and mder d t i w  of a w i n g  
menace to Ctschadwalria it will play this role to a dl gmatcr 
extent than bithem. 
In this way, as we see, the Wzat im of Czechodovakia 
is being accomplished up to the present moment. W- 
democrag has here acquired a most active role as the force 
whi& ushers in fascisrli under the banner of defending 
democracy.. 
- 
- u- 
Soeiaf-dmmcracy in ~zecbost'ivakia is the author of the 
mtrmdhuy law, af plans to suppress the Comrniinist 
wgaaizations and the Communist .Party. Czech fascisal is 
being established by Czechoslovakian social-democracy ant1 
by its d i t i o n  with the bourgeois parties. But of course this 
p m  of fascization will not stop there. It need not neres- 
arsrily happen that Czechoslovakia-n socid-den~ocracy will I w 
destroyed as German social-democracy was. Its end ma! 
come somewhat differently and in a less tragic form th711 
w a s  the case in &many. But in the last analysis the wnse- 
queaces will be the same. Czechoslovakian social-democracy 
is killing itself as a party by doing away with "democracy" 
in the country. Czech social-damracy is showing in prac- 
tice that it is not only not a socialist party but not even a 
democratic party in the old Massaryk sense of the ward. It 
is a party of the reactionary bourgeoisie and together wit11 
it is establishing fascist dictatorship. 
If there had been a truly bourgeois-detnmratic party in 
Czechoslovakia, it would have taken the course of broad- 
ening democracy, of liberating the oppressed peoples, nf con- 
summating the agrarian revolution. of the plebian struggle 
against fascism and war. But there is no such party in 
Czechoslovakia. such a party is no longer to be fot~ntl ill 
any imperialist country. 
All the bourgeois parties, including social-democrauy, have 
become parties of reaction, of counter-revolutim. 
There is only one party of revolirtion-the Communi?it 
Party. 
Social-danocracy lias lost its own independent cl~aractvr 
as a party ; it m p i e s  a place in the united cor~nter-revolu- 
tinnary fmnt togetl~er with the ~phole bo~~rgeoisie. 
The sttcckss of fascism is the co~lsequa~ce of the f %, 
tion af social-democracy, the consequence of the fact ' 
socialdemcxraey has become a social-fascist party, w kt 
had already noted at the Sixth Congxess of tbe Comintfxn, 
If social-dcmocroty iu 1918 had &em a r e v o l w k j  
Mar.~+t party, Ewrofic 7twrrld Itat-c bcen socialist long ,& 
If so&-dmmacy k 1933 hod bem wet& a dcwwcratic 
prty, Gerrrrany could no# l fnv~  becurlt~ farcist. 
The pre~ent crisis of sod-denrocracy is a crisis &g 
avt of its @id fwcimrion, out of its capitulatiosl to fa&. 
5, The PecuWtks of the Pretaent Crisis of 
Social-Democrat y 
The present crisis of social-denlocracy is radically differ- 
ent from i ts  crisis which k p n  at the time of the imperial- 
ist war. Then socialdemocracy, which had degenerated into a 
ref orrnist petty-bourgeois party, betrayed the working class 
and in each individual country went over to the side of its 
own bmrrgmisie, beesme a party of social-nationalists, 
social-chauvinists, d - p a t r i o t s ,  social-imperialists. Having 
disrupted the German and A u s h  proletariat in rgr8, it 
was reborn as a party of the so-dled "democratic path to 
socialism." "peaeefd growing into socidism," as a party 
basing itself upon democratic-patriotic and pacifist-~triotic 
illusions of the war-weary masses. The Second Xntematiunal 
was restored after the foundation of the League of Nations 
as a " d i i s t  a m d a g e  to it." It took as the basis of its 
e x t d  @icy the collaboration of the capitalist govern- 
ments in the League of Nations and a struggfe against the 
U.S.S.R. It took as the &is of its internal policy the split- 
ting of the hbor movement, the struggle against commun- 
ism, It took as the W s  of its inner-party policy the utiliza- 
tion of the old formerly Marxist organizations of the work- 
ing class as a means of throttling its revolutionary energy. 
The premmt crisis of this post-war Second International 
began when the growing contrast between the country where 
s o d i s m  is being built and the countries of decaying capital- 
ism was revealed and became clear, when German d- 
demmrav capitulated to Hitler. 
The disintegration of the Second International is twofold : 
on the international scale its disintegration amrds with the 
national antagonisms of the bourgeois states, whik in each 
country it is disintegrating into individual groups which re- 
%ect the degree of fasciation of the various strata of social- 
democracy in the given country. It is an expression of the 
fact that at the present time smS-democracy has turned 
tmitor not ody as a revolutionary party but also a a re 
formist party, as a demoeratic party. It is therefore perfect- 
ly correct at the present time to speak mt o d y  of tku polit- 
kul defeat but of the &ologicd cutmtr~phe of social- 
democracy. 
The ideological catastrophe leads to the fact that the 
group into which social-democracy has disintegrated criti- 
cize each other, accuse exh other, employing isolated scraps 
of their old idedogid equipment. 
In G m n y  there is now no social-democratic organiza- 
tion. German socialdmtmacy comprises the Pmgw group, 
which puts forward the slogan of ''Revolution against Hit- 
ler, for the restoration of demmracy," the Bwiim group of 
bebe-Kuender which has adapted itself to the fascist re- 
gime in so far as it - permitted to do so, the Paris g m p  
which mixes a few radical phrases with its social-democfatic 
ideological mess, and, in addition to these, dozens of small 
groups and writers who criticize their own ideology but are 
unable to rise to the level of Marxism, of communism, who 
have utterly lost their heads and by their ideolegiml con- 
fusion seriously hinder the struggle of the working class. 
Each of these groups by its methods is hdding kck 7 &% 
masses from going over to wmmunigm. 4 3 
Is P m c e  the p u p  of Renaudel-Deat, which is m p  
going over to the a m p  of bourgeois nationalism, the grwrp 
of Blum, which is striving to maintain the old pitions, the 
"Acthn Sodistd' group which expressa the Left swiqg of 
the working masses. In England there are the national labor- 
ites, the laborites, the 1.L.P. ; aad in A u k  and Switzerland * 
there are the b e g i d n p  of disintegration, and there are two 
parties in Holland. In h o s t  every muutry there are W d y  
at least three socialdem~cratic parties and in each d i -  
demoeratic party there are dozens of different viewpints 
which are united only by th& common role as main social 
support of the bourgeoisie and by the struggle against the 
Codntern . 
The Second International is formally attempting to unite 
this chaos of nationalist patties, of confused groups and 
groupings. I t  advaates reconciliation between Blum and 
Renaudel (the last d o n  of the bureau of the Stand Id- 
t e ~ t o & a ~ m ~ ~ ~ , ~ . W & a m + .  
Wdewitz. It calmly* ikdeprtmean& t h e m  d. 
Wels. It writes dut ions  in whidt aII hopes are pinned on 
the miracle which is suppod to take place in Genwa, whae 
the collapsing League of Nation9 and. the bankrupt "Dis- 
armament h f a e n e e "  we supposed to unite and disarm dl 
the hnprialh.  This indeed ism-tamomt to losing dl 
sense of seriousness I This means losing not only their potit- 
ical line but their heads as d And this is not anfy Gennan 
sdddemoeraq but ~ whole Second Internatid. And 
this is kt tx  there was not any sp&I policy of Geman 
mid-democracy, bemuse there was and is oie common 
policy of all i n t e m t i d  socialdemmracy, bemuse the fate 
of German ~ l - d e m ~  is shared by the socialdemo- 
cratic parties of all countries. All of them are rallying to- 
gether the toos&t?r-fmIntionury f votss together with the 
whde bourgeoisie for the smggle wiwt tlre proletarian 
vflked front; 5LU af them are pursuing the policy of weak- 
wing fhe proletariat; all of them are social-fascist, parties 
which capitulate to fascism. 
But w h t  are the causes, of this crisis of social-denlorracy ? 
The causes of the crisis of social~lemocracv consist firstlv 
kn the fact that the world i s  on the eve of b new rouh :f 
mprialist wars, the preparations for which have already led 
?o a rabid outburst of nationalism. Therefore the Second 
International is colIapdng because the smial-drmocmcy of 
- - 
each country is going over to the side of its own bourg&isie. 
Secondly, present day sodaldemmracy could only exist i11 
the bourgeois system of government when parliamentarisnl 
existed. In view of that extraordinary centralization of state 
power of which I have already spoken, it has already heconie 
unnecessary in the direct apparatus of government in a nurn- 
ber of countries. Thirdiy, the growth of poverty and want 
among the masses, the growth of the influence of the Corn- 
munist Parties has led to sdal-democracy losing its inass 
influence. This is compelling it to comply still Ittore quickly 
with the demands of its bourgeoisie, to become fascised at 
a still more rapid rate. 
Hence the &alerated fascization of social-demoeraey in 
each individual country, the disintegration of soeialgdemoc- 
racy into a number of individual groups and parties, denot- 
ing diEereut degrees of its fascieatiw ; hence, the disintegra- 
of the Second International into its national component 
in connection with the regroupings of pwers for the 
imperialist war ; hence the confusion and bankruptcy 4 . of social-democratic ideology represented by the bankruptcy 
of the theory of "democratic sociaIism," die disappearance 
t ~ f  illusions about the peaceful development of capitalis~n 
and about the "denlocratic path to socialism." 
opmly harnessing them 
The "Lrftd' remain 
back the masses from going over to communism. T& 
"Rights" act and organize ; the "Lefts" write "Left" d t t -  
tions and talk with their radical phraseology, with thdr 
"Left" speeches about the dictatorship of the proIetarht, : 1 
plans about the reforms of social-democracy, etc., they try I 
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to k e g  the masses in the counter-revolutionarp united f rbnt 
with tht bourpisie. This is the division of labor, this is 
the mIe of the "Lefts." 
In these circumstances of the disintegration of k a l -  
democracy the small groups of Trotsky, Brander, e t ~ ,  stmc 
the bourgeoisie for holding back the masses from going over 
, to the Communists, for the purpose of subjecting thc work- 
ing class to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. They try to 
carry out what is at present the most important and most dif - 
ficult task for the b o u r g e o i s k  bsk which the old social- 
, democracy has a l d y  lost the power to U. In addition to 
this they are the main purveyors of theories and arguments 
against the U.S.S.R. and the Cominkm. And they are 
1 carrying out a third task which is also of importance to 
the fascis&the p w l v ~ n g  of the ktbm mwemgnt, the task 1 of converting it into a mnglorneration of sects and p u p s .  
I This is  their rote as an advanced d-ent of the eormter- I revolutionary kgeoisie. The C o m m t l e  International, 'which is fighting against d d - d u n m m q ,  mPkPf at t& s a w  time c w y  m a m q l e  fur the destmctim of the grotrps of Trotskyist8 a d  B n d M t e s  ~ v k o  we modrr- 
aged by tkff  fas&s, apzirrpt the dhkt@u of the bbor 
mmemmt &to d l  .paups, a stmggle to wkfe it dff 
fhr I~nderskip of the CommrrtrdJts. C 31 
6. W e  Are Marching Towards Revolution 
The crisis of social-demmracy represents one of the most 
w r t a n t  component parts in the general crisis of the cap- 
itaIist system. In Germany the mas= of the people do not 
want to live undir Hitler's jack-boot, nor do they want to 
return to Weimar democracy. In Poland, Hungary, Italy, 
fascist dictatorship is obviously wakening. Austria is in 
the melting pot. In tatvia and Esthonia a considerable part 
of the population is looking for a party capable of expelIing 
the governing clique overnight, although these masses are 
not yet prepared for proletarian revolution. In Japan tlie 
will of the masses for revolution is breaking through the 
system of rabid terror. Mighty revolutionary events may 
begin with complete unexptxtedaess. It is therefore our 
duty, as Comrade Kuusinen said, to pu t  on the order of tlts 
day t k  qwsth of struggle for Sm*et power, of werthrow 
hy the POW# of the ruling clars4s by mermes of alp arrrred 
or-g. It is our duty to put forward everywhere the pro- 
gram of S&t gwemment and to mobilize the masses 
around it, to malce them ready so that, knowing our airns, 
they may be able, given a suitable correlation of forces, whal 
a revolutionary situation Is ripe, to take power into their 
own bands. There is wt ygt u rmllr$knary h u t d o n  iiz any 
one of the decisive kperidirt c m i k s ,  but such a situa- 
tion may mature in a very short time. The present stage is 
no longer a stage of peaceful development. For the majority 
of countries the present stage is no longer a perid in which 
it is simply necessary to expose socialdemocraey. The pres- 
ent stage in Germany, in Austria, is no longer simply a 
period of struggle to win over the majority of the working 
class, h t  a period of the f m & s  of o rmoluthary army 
for d e d v e  clws battles for tower, a period of the mobiIiza- 
tion of such cadres as are prepared to make any sacrifice in 
I order to destroy the existing regime, in order to lead the p letariat to victory. What does this mean? Spontawous pm- are,  spmtaworrs srwest is to be obstrved amwg the massts, although it is not yet b d n g  out openly to the surfact. The Communists do not always make use of this spontanc- 
w s  w e s t ,  do not always give d i d o n  to it. The Cosn- 
munists are not always on the alert when discontent passes 
beyond the bounds of ccx)namje demands, when it is directed 
qdwt the state ar a whole* 
W e  must be more sensitive to this spuda~oacs  presswe, 
S ~ ~ & I # W D W  l s 8 s t  Ww the -8s. 
In G m m y  the masses are trying to find in what way, to 
what extent and in what forms it is possible to combat tbc 
I fascist dictatorship. A31 that is needed is the beginning of 
some large strike or demonstration, and tht way will be optn 
I for the discontent of the mses to burst forth. Therefore, in cunjunction wth the slogan of struggle for power, we ought to put on the order of the day the slogau of the g w d  xh-&e, of a general strike organized and car- 
ried through by the Communists, and for which it is wien- 
tial to mobilize the masses by developing economic strikes, 
IN A& the slogan of the general Wtid strike was 
put forward by the s&-democrats under mass pressure, 
but the soeiddemocrats are more afraid of revolution than 
of fascism. The Communists must exert all their darts 
towards giving shape to the spontaneous pressure of the 
masses, who denaand such a strike. The Communists must 
be the chief agitatom for the genwal strike. This does not 
apply in the same degree to Latvia. But it appIies in just 
the same degree to dl other countries which are under the 
threat of the setting up of fascist dictatorship. 
IN Pdaad, while there has been a large strike movement 
this year, there have been fewer political strikes, but this 
ought not by any means to signify, and it does not signify, 
tkt  thc resdrrtim of the Twelfth Plenum on a general 
miice in POI& can be forgottm. It -not be forgotten. 
. Jlr Cmrthhqakk under the d 4 e m b e r a t i c  coalition 
gwernment there haw beem a n u m k  of @ml political 
&ken directed against the state. Thy can and ought to 
apptar @n. Tbe development of wents of the last few , 
w e b  in G ~ o v a k i a  bout which several of our Czech 
commies have qdcen in their speeches, permits us to hope 
that there wilI be a growth in the political strike movement 
in C+osloPakia 
A h a ,  England a d  Frauce, of course, still remain 
codes where the strikes are mainly economic, but here 
too it is ntxmary to raise the strike movement from the 
led of the economic strike to that of the political strike. 
Amdm in particular may soon h canfronted with large 
political strikes. The American Party ought naw to direct 
the unrest of the masses in this direction. 
What slogans a n  now be put forward for the mass polit- 
ical strike? These slqans ou&t to rouse the masses for the 
s tqgle  for power, to lead the masses from defense to at- 
tuck. In Austria, La&, Czechoslovakia, everywhere wliere 
fmism is advancing, the pditiml strike sets itself the task 
of defending the elementary rights of the workers, of strug- 
gling against the realization of fascist di&orship, of fight- 
ing against the p e n t  government, which is carrying out 
fascism. 
la Germany the fdlowing slogans may k put forward for 
dK political strike: freedom to elect factory committees, re- 
lease of dl arrested p e r m ,  removal of the storm troops 
from the working dass districts, werthrow of the fascist 
dictatorship, setting up of Soviet power. 
But in the formation of the revolutionary army the most 
important point is the tactic of the united front. Basing itself 
m the spontaneous unrest of the masses, the Communist 
- 
Party must appeal to the smial-democratic arrd no 
workers, not letting the movement out of its b& fw atr 
instant, The Communists must explain that the way to fa- 
cism may be barred by victoriouq joint action of ail workers 
I under the leadership of the Communist Party. Thcy mast explain tbat if social-democracy did not fight agaihst fd in Germany, this has nothing to do with the split in the labor movement. The bIame for the fascists cofiring to power in Germany, as in any 0 t h  country, les solely on the d- . democrats. The split in the labor moverraent has nothing to 
1 do with it. The splitters are the social-democrats, who 
formed a counter-revolutionary united front with the bur- 
. geaisie. Always, at any moment, a revolutionary united f mnt 
for struggle against the bourgeoisie, for struggle against 
fascism, could k formed, if social-democrag were willing 
to fight against fascism. It will be formed wrist the will 
of social-democracy when the workers become convinced 
that mid-democmcy i s  betraying them to the fascists. 
There is nothing worse than not to understand this. 
One good element in the German tactic of the united front 
I has always been that the German comrades always told tbe social-democratic workers the truth about their party and always correctly indicated the way which they ought to go. .And it is perfectly correct when they now say that the most important thing is not to prmit the re-establishment of 
smial-democratic leadership in the labor organizatians, above 
all in the trade unions, not to permit tbe labor organizations 
I to be utilized for holding back the working masses fro111 struggle. The bad element in the Gutmann tactics in Czechoslovakia was that Gutmann advocated unity for unity's sake, that he was not guided by the task of forming a revolutionary 
army to fight for the political aims of our Party, for the 
stniggle for power, but called upon his comrades to adapt 
t h d v e s  to the backward tendencies and views of the 
&aemcma& WQrkCrs. 
Thtrefore the T h I m n ~  tactics of the united front were 
rev01utionary w& the G- *tics of the united front 
were opsortuaist, liquidationist. 
Inasmuch as G r f m a ~ h ,  if we may so express our- 
selves, has taken root in certain sections of the Commuoist 
Party of ~z;xhoslovakia, it has, of course, wrought great 
. hann in this Party, but the Communist Party of C%echo- 
slopalcia is sufficiently strong, has sufiiciwtly strong cadres 
and sufficiently strong connections with the masses to mend 
the mistakes under the leadership of Comrade Cottwdd and 
to march f m r d  to new victories. 
7. Tbe German Qtrestioa and the Canmumist 
International 
Three great questions at present form the touchstone of 
the revoltltionary maturity and clas9-consciousness of evwy 
Communist Party, of every Communist, of every revolu- 
tionary. Firsfly, the question of the U.S.S.R., the under- 
standing of the roIe and significance of the U.S.S.R. for the 
international proletarian revolution, the understanding of 
the policy of the U.S.S.R,. the understanding of the fact 
that the U.S.S.R. is a model for the transformation of all 
countries. He who does not devote all his strength to the 
defense of the U.S.S.R. is no revdationary ; he is a counter- 
revolutionary, an opponent of the dictatorship of the pro- 
letariat, an opponent of the socialist revolution. Secondly, 
the question of the attitude to the Chinese revolution and 
the Chinese Soviet Republic. H e  who does not devote all his 
strugh and organizational abilities to the defense of the 
Chinese revolution and the Chinese Soviet Republic is break- 
ing up the international union of Communists, is not fight- 
ing for the union of the p r o l d t  of 
tabat, about Sovet power in his own eonnttp. 
. questio~l of the attitade to t?h Geman revoIutibn,'tha 
standing of its problems a d  of tbe strag& of '& 
pmkmriat. H e  who docs 'not undetstand the Getmaa -- 
tion does not understand the paths of d d o p e n t  o# tbZ 
proletarian revolution in E w  He who daes not 
all his powers to the suppoc of the Getman prdimrw.is 4 
not fighting for pdletari;ur revoluti~1 in Etrrope h t w e  the 1 
*of t b e ~ p r o l & r i a t d d ~ t h e ~ o f  
the pmIetarlaa revolution througbut the whole of Europe, 
and the defeat of the German ptoktariat would retard tbe 
develop- of the proletarb nvdution in other 
mtr;es. 
Gctmaay was and remain5 the we&& link in the Ehrds. 
of imppiaht stab. Germany is a -try in which. class 
connrradictions are most ammtuWd Gemnay is a cmmtty 
in which dl the contradidum of the @talist world ,a 
i ~ r t w i n e d i u t h e ~ f t x m . A n d b t s i d e s t h i s , ~ p  
k the h& of capitslist Europe, a comtry which is etm 
mmically and plitidly iDtcmoven WMI 4 31 ~~ 
counties af Eurape. That is why the prolefaria nwlu- 
tionisnearerinGermrrnythaninanyotheranthtry.And 
the victory of the pm1- in Gemm~y means the dcWy 
of the prolttarian ~~ tbrqhoat  all Ewmpe, s k k  
&talist Europe mutat &st if it 1- its k a r t  It is ther$ 
fore clear that Guinan qudms  are the fu&W 
tiom on the eve of the stmnd round bf wars and d u -  
t tions. And thirs l h m s  upon the Commtmist Parties, a- dl Cammis& a mpmm -for the fate d -  th Eerman redlltiw1, T l m c s n ~ a f ~ s m h ~ w a a a  gmt  37 
a test of how each party and each Communist understood 
the internatid situation and the course of development 
of khe revolutionary process. This test showed us our 
strength and also, of course, the rottell elements whicli still, 
unfortunately, remain in wr ranks. 
We must above all note with great pleasure that our young 
S m h  Communist Party and its central organ Murtdo 
Obrmo, itself in the fire of revolution, has from the very 
start correctly appraised the situation in Germany, the sig- 
nificance of German events, and has been able to develop a 
great mnpaign of international proletarian solidarity with 
the German proletariat. The Polish Communist Party like- 
wise unfolded a vigorous cafnpaign of solidarity while itself 
fighting under the yoke of fascism. The Communist Party of 
Poland developed a widespread campaign in the factories, 
plants and mines. During several months its whole press 
was devoted to German &airs. It told the masses : 
"The German proletariat is not isolated, it will be sur- 
rounded by the active solidarity and aid of the revolutionary 
world proletariat which understands that the victory of the 
Gerrnan d i s t  revolution guarantees the victory of the 
world revolution. In this active struggle the toiling masses 
of Poland who are themselves fighting under the fascist 
yoke will be the first to play their part." 
The Austrian, BeJgh, Danish, Dutch and a number of 
other small parties developed a mass movement and carried 
on work of enlightenment among the masses quite energetic- 
dly, in proportion to their strength. The Communist parties 
of the United States, France and Czechoslovakia showed 
themselves much w ~ k e r ,  that is, in proportion to their 
strength, on the question of supporting the German prole- 
tariat. The Americw comrades for a considerable time did 
not devote serious attention to this q~restion or explain the 
essence of the events in h a n y  to tbe m m a .  % g-: 
Communist Party, after a certain inertia in the &st &@& 
when it evidmfly underestimated the necessity of a stm& 
against fascism, later on-and here Comrade G a k b  C( 
quite right-was able to develop a serious and uninterwptied 
campaign and to take up a deaf political line. Irr C s e h -  
I s d m k k  the anti-faxist campaign of solidarity, which did 
not begin badly, was greatly wdened  thanks to the oppor- 
tunism of the Gutmann group which controlled the Party 
press with the help of the "ultra-Left, historidy-Left" 
Comrade Reumaan. (tatqkter. ) 
They had some 6'historieal Rights." I think we may say 
with qua] justice that they have some "historical Lefts" 
who in reality are "Rights." (Lu~ghtw . )  
The same applies to Fra~fce where Trotskyist views were 
rife in the Party during March and April to the efI& ht 
the C.P.G. bad capitulated, where the Cdk.s de B o k b  
irnic busied itself more with hunting out the 4'mistakesJ' 
of the C.P.G. than with exposing the treacherous role played 
by s c x h l d e m m  in the victory of fascism h Germany, 
than in mobilizing the against German faxism. 
But, comrades, if we may point to a n u m k  of successes 
achieved by mr Farti- in th is  spbere, which show the 
growth of a real internationalism, nevertheless even in those 
places where our campaign of support of the German revolu- 
tion and our work of explaining the meaning of the Ger- 
man events was conducted best of all, we must consider 
it far from satisfactory, In particular, our campaign of sup 
port and defense of the German proletariat in connection 
with the trial of Dimitroff, Torgler, Popoff and Tan& was 
far from adequate. If we compare this mas? campaign which 
we have just now dedoped with the ampolign which wan 
developed by the international proletariat in connection with 
Saeco and Venzetti, then we must admit that that campaign 
was, more widespread than the present one. We have not 
yet beat able to rise to this leveI, although the political irn- 
portsum of the Wzig trial is much greater than that of 
Sccu and Venzetti. At that time we were at the very begin- 
ning of the revolutionary upurge It was on the basis of the 
eqmience of the mass movement for the defense of Sacco 
and V d  that we first came to the ondusion &at there 
was a growth of the revolutionary upsurge, a new revolu- 
tionary upurge. Now we are on the eve of the second 
round of molutiws and wars. If at that time it was the 
&inning of a mighty new movement now tbis widespread 
cmpajgn of wfidarity with our German comrades, with the 
Up ig  prisoners, our international struggle for the German 
revolution, our support of the German revolution, our mass 
movement against f d s t  terror can k o m e  the starting 
point for mighv poiitid actions and mwements of the 
working dass. 
8 .  The Struggle Against ttLeft'' Social- 
Democracy and the Right Deviations 
in the Communist Parties 
And here, comrades, I must ask what were the grounds 
for, what was the meaning of the stand taken by Comrade 
Gutrnann, who directly sabotaged the printing and popular- 
ization of the resoIution of the E.C.C.1. an the situation in 
Gemany, and also what were the grounds for the theses of 
Comrade Reurnam's opportunist colleagues from the editor- 
ial staE of the Cahiers de B ~ l c h d r m t ?  
These comrades lost &e revolutionary perspective, suc- 
cumbed to the influence of socialdmoaaq, in particular to 
the influence of the Btandeites and Trotskyites, who are 
waging a furious campaign against the Camintern and the 
C.P.G. 
g i 
, I  
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.4t the time when the qG~ulation of S&d-DumE&'l 
to Hitler in Germany w&s ewking ind&n&ion - 
working masses of other countrid, when the w o ? k e W M ~  
were indigrlsrlf at the cbrrdnct of the G e m  ddWib* 
crats were threataing to go over to the ComnimW, S o d .  
democracy attempted b big &euver &ahst the U.S.S,R.q 
and the Cornintern so as to &&edit t h  in thc e p  $f" 
the toiling masses. The Czecboslo~au &4amxWs! W 
claied that the LS.S;R. had deceived the hopes bf German 
prbletarians by not starting a war again& ' b c h +  This g k -  I 
ing prwmtional campaign however did not h8w much 
success. 
Then a krnpaign wak started to the & that tlh U.S. 
S.R. was betraying the cause of the w o r k g  b by main- 
taining normal diplomatic relations with Germany, But th t  
language of power in which tbe U.S.S;R. talked to Ger- 
many cornfled this campaign to cesrsc 
For us Communists it is no dishonor if the largest and 
most arrogant apiblist mmiiy, the United Shta.. rrmg- 
nizes the U.S.S.R. after sixteen years in order to stmgthm 
the cause of peace and its own pition. For us Gwnmun- 
ist's it is no dishonor if Mussolini invites Litpinoff to come 
to Rome. The U.S.S.R. speaks to all of h in a language 
of power. For us Communists it is a supremc acknow~dge 
nlent when our bitterest enemies are cornpellecl to talk with 
the U.S.S.R. For us Communists it is -a supreme acknowl- 
edgment w h k  all the bourgeois states are compelled to 
reckon with the power of the U.S.S.R., with the' power of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
It is now no longer fitting to talk simply of a contrast, 'it 
now behooves us to talk of the preponderance' of the U.S.S.R. 
over any imperialist state individually and over whole groups 
of imperialist 'countries. When the ampa@ against the 
U.S.S.R. collapsed, the socialdmrats put forward the 
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slogan of boycotting German goods. Several papers at that: 
time rqrorted incomedy that the Communists were not 
taking part in the lmycott because, they alleged, the boy- 
cott was in condict with the economic interests of the U.S. 
53.  The U.S.S.R. has no interests which are at variance 
with the interests of the world revolution, and the interna- 
t i d  proletariat naturally has no interests which are at 
d a n c e  with those of the Soviet Union. . 
But what could the boycutt bring to the proletariat of 
Germany and thc Gqman revolution? An accentuation of 
economic war in the interests of competing groups of cap- 
italism. Can a boycott undermine the existence of a capital- 
iit'country? Obviously not, Why shwfd we take part in 
such a boycott for the conduct of which the social-democrats 
'ihcmdves undertake nothing, which the sodaldemmrats 
wgnted to foist upon the Communists, which was aimless 
and doomed to failure ? 
The most coherent argument prduced by the Austrian 
swial-democrats in their reports about the boycott was that 
Austrian socialdemocracy ought to boycott Germany be- 
cause the Germany of Hitler was preventing tourists f m  
coming to Austria What signif iace has this for the inter- 
ests of the international labor movement? For the patrons 
of A u s t i i ~  hotels-yes, but for the international labr 
movement, hardly. 
If it is a question of the real interests of the German 
revolution, if the boycott wif1 constitute a ml support for 
the revolutionary movement in Germany, for the struggle 
to overthrow Hitler, if there will be a r d  mass movement 
for the hycott, if there will be a mass movement in Ger- 
many itself, then it is the Communists who will organize 
such a boycott. 
Pornless in their bankruptcy and in their malice against 
the Communist International and against the U.S.S.R., t l le  
I 
Brandlerit- and Trot 
not only the German S 
bankrupt, that the German Communist Party is  
too. In order to conceal the bank 
are trying to show that h t h  parties are bankntpt. T 
cowards and scoundrels have begun to demand that 
C.P.G. should have commenced an uprising at the moment 
when Hitler came to power, The aim of' this maneuver wasc 
obvious-to discredit the only party which is capable of 
organizing the masses for revolution, of leading the m 
to revolution. The most "Left" of them, fm -1% B e -  
way, at thc time when the C.P.G. was aIfeady evoking 
the admiration of everybody by its heroism, introduced their 
own formula at the "intunational" conference of the rene- 
gade groups to the effect that "not only has the policy of 
social-democracy proved bankrupt in Germany, but the 
C.P.G. is aha responsible for the German mbstqhe;  al- 
though it has proved molutionafy and sound in the main. 
yet its collapse is to k explained by incorrect tactics." 
It may well bc asked if Gutmann did not accept this 
"Left" thesis when he declared that "certain weaknesses of 
the C.P.G. in adopting the united front facilitated the vic- 
tory of Hitler," that ''if we do not acknowledge the mistakes 
of the C.P.G., then we must n d y  take the view that 
fascist dictatorship is inevitable." Did not these "Lefts" 
present a list of the "mistakes" of the C.P.G. to the editors 
of the C&s de Bok-? Did not these "Lefts" give 
the arch-sPhyni Comrade Humbert Broz his argument that 
by its answer to the appeal of the Serond International the 
Cornintern began a new tactic on the question of the united 
front 7 
These gaople, together with the Remmefe-Neumann p u w  
made common cause with ' 'hftPr daldemocrsley. - 
lost their heads at the deasive moment and W e  pa- 
43 
who @ the arguments of the social-democrats, became 
liqddators in rqaM to their own party. 
h b thetefote n-ry above all to take a clew stmd 
ila r~gwd to so&Ldmocrq~ and first ad fore& in rr- 
gard to T e f P  s o ~ m ~ y ,  this most dangerous foe of 
c m r s r n h .  ' 
In the dtctions at G m  after the g~eat political wents 
of last year the s o d - d e m d  win a great victory and the 
Communists su&r defeat. The workers s a y  truly : how can 
we vote for the Communists when we annot see the diEer- 
ence behveen Communists and soeial-democrats? At Geneva 
the kal-democrats are the "Lefts" and the Communists 
the "Rights." But the '2eft" social-democrat Nicole at Ge- 
neva formed a bloc with the bourgeois parties, formed a 
coalition government and got into power. In the name of 
this coalition & n e n t  he is now pdaiming "workers' 
and m8 demmracy" in Geneva, prochiming Geneva tm 
be a socialist republic. It is said that several Communists 
are attracted by this and welcome the government of Nicole. 
But Nicole has more thafi once used "Left" phrases and then 
more than once "gone to Canossa," to capitulate to the 
''Rights." We have no grounds whatever for trusting the 
"uItra-left" Nicole. W e  must present him' with demands, 
expose him, &y even now tbat Nicole is in alliance witb the 
bourgeoisie, that he wiII not go against the bourgeoisie, but 
d l  go together wth the bourgeoisie against the workers. 
We must imbue the masses with the consciousness that the 
proletariat cannot come to power otherwise than by over- 
throwing the bourgeoisie and smashing its state machine. 
Gmwu is $i typical example and that is why I chaose to 
speak of Geneva. We must say that there is no wentiaI 
difference between the a f t "  d d e m o c r a t s  and the 
"right" baurgeois parties. If the "Rights" shmt down hun- 
dreds and thousands of workers and boast of it, thc "Left" 
sociaI4emmts of the type of Nicole 
than and will weep: "This is what I, a 
have been brought to by the 
difference, comrades. 
There are not and cannot be any Lefts our 
We are the only Lefts. We ought to say this quite clearly 
today. In the present situation, in order to m e  o real 
revo?utionary, it is necessary to come out openly againat 
counter-revolutionaiy sd-democracy, What sort of reyo- 
lutionary is N i d e  in Switzerland and Fischw in Austria, 
if they submit to the commands of the sadal-democratic 
leadership ? 
Either join us, or we fight y o d e r e  is no otber way. 
Moreover, our fight against the "Lefts" will be the fienxst 
of all because thgr r e p m t  the bourgeoisie's kt line of 
trenches. 
In order that our line in regard to social-democracy may 
be clear, a determined s t m e  is necessary against oppor- 
t r r & m  in our ozm ranks. 
The Runmete-Neumann group came forward under a 
"Left" disguise; Gutmann under a Right. But both the one 
and the other are parrot-like imitators of smialdemocracy. 
The fact that sodaldernorracy is through a profound 
crisis only shows that a still sharper struggIe is necessary 
against it, against all its groups and at the same t h e  a strug- 
gle on two fronts in our own ranks. 
Only in this way will we be able to carry out those su- 
preme tasks which confront us. 
It is only we who are conveying Communist d o u s n e s s  
into the spontaneously growing labor movement. Without 
stubborn work on our part we caanot win over tk majority 
of the working class for the revolutionary struggle. Only 
where the spontaneous movement is united with the con- 
I 
" ' .I &nu work of the Communists d o a  revolutionary action re- 
sult. 
The most important task, for all Parties now, bat esp.Cial- 
ly for the German, Gechoslwakian and Austrian P'arties, 
is to ensure political leadership over the masses, to react 
in g o d  time to events, to give out political slogans at the 
right time. 
This alone will ensure our leadexsftip over the masses. The 
second most important & is to be able to combine illegal 
work with a truly mass character in this work, 
The third task is to ensure real continuity in the work of 
each Party organhation, beginning with the nucleus and a d -  
ing witb the Central Camminee, so that we may not permit 
events to dip by us, so that we may react to all events. 
The f d  most important task is proletarian interna- 
tionalism, not in words but in deeds. 
And in the combination of dl these tasks the best living 
example for the moment was and remains wt of alf ill@ 
@es the Communist Party of Poland, this oldest mask 
ifiegal m* 
Our tasks we hard but our a i m  are great a d  clear, our 
path is trrrr. W e  rran say this today with more grounds than 
at any other time. Only think what would have happened 
if the BoIshepiks had not combatted opportunism in the 
S a n d  International for thirty years, if the Communist In- 
t d o n a l  had not been founded fifteen years ago, if the 
Soviet Union did not exist. Then the European labor move- 
ment would have been smashed, torn to pieces by national- 
ism. Fascism would have celebrated its victory. The work- 
ing Jass, betrayed by social-democracy, would have been 
without prospects for the future, without leadership. 
Now there is no power which can smash us. The fate of 
the world labor movement in the last analysis lies in our 
I I hands. S d a k b ~ e r a c y  is .trying to die ml! fieye in the epach of fascism; we are grdvhg that a * t  round of revdutiong and wsrs G ~ J  ahead M rem& tion will forestall war or war revolution, we do mot h. But war, too, is unable tb terrify us, for after it revolution The U.S.S.R. has grown into the mightiest power in world politics. -ism has h e n  made a r d i  
on one-stah + of the earth's surface. The Chinese ,Wet 
RepubIic is growing. W e  wiU leave this Plenum with the 
, -
slogan of stmgj$e for Saviet power t b u g h w t  the whole 
world. 
But what is demanded now of each one of us? 
What is now demanded above all of every Commrmit 
is one lhhg--th wilt for tkk s t ~ g g t e  fw powm. 
Tks udi to poever means a stubborn, hard, self-sacri6cing 
' 
struggle to win over the majority of the -king class, to 
form a mdutionary army of utterly devoted fighters for 
' Communism. 
The wilt to p m w  means stubborn work in &fmdhg the 
daily interests of the working class in the factork, the 
plants, the trade dons ,  the labr exchanges. 
The d l  to means a hard stubborn struggle to win 
allies of the proletariat in the revolution, to win over the 
peasant maws,  the masses of the petty-bourgeoisie in the 
towns who have been ruined by the crisis, for he wha dues 
nat think of allies is not facing the question of power mri- 
oudy, is not thinking d o u s l y  about tbc dictatorship of ttae 
proletadat. 
The to p o w e ~  means a struggle against war and fa!+ 
cism, for the defense of the U.S,S.R, and of the Ctslnese 
Souicts, fur the defense of the German prakhrht. 
I recall the andent Russian saga about Mikuh Setpuh- 
a, who possessed tremendous strength but d d  not find 
a pulley. 
47 
'1f 'T d d  find a pulley," he said, "I would lift up the 
WMc d." ', 
We have found &is pulley. 
This pdey is work among the masses. 
Our strength is tremendous, and if we apply this strength 
to mass work, if we overcome our weaknesw, r d y  get 
to work in' &e f8ctodeg and plants and trade unions, then 
despite thh: whole world bourgeoisie, despite faxism, we 
will oPerturn tlie who15 worId and assure the complete vic- 
tory of the proletariat. (Pkolonged appkrwse.) 
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